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Title : Vincere: The Italian Royal Army's Counterinsurgency Operations in Africa 1922–1940

Author : Federica Saini Fasanotti

category : Books,History,Europe

Publisher : Federica Saini Fasanotti

ISBN-10 : 1682474283

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Vincere: The Italian Royal Army's Counterinsurgency Operations in Africa 1922–1940 by Federica Saini Fasanotti


Read Online and Download Vincere: The Italian Royal Army's Counterinsurgency Operations in Africa 1922–1940 by Federica Saini Fasanotti. Vincere! presents an overview of the counterinsurgency operations carried out by the Italian Royal Army from 1922 to 1941 in Libya and Ethiopia. Based on ten years of study conducted in the Italian archives and on the ground, this volume looks at a period when the Italian Royal Army faced significant new challenges in the conduct of war. Facing new challenges in an atypical theater of war, Italian Royal Army forces learned significant lessons that would shape the conduct of future combat. In the period covered in this work, Italian Royal Army forces had to adapt to new terrain, while modifying their techniques and methods in relation to the local populations and the overall characteristics of the territories in Africa. Moving away from a reliance on heavy, slow battalions formed for the most part by Italian troops, the Italians instead turned to mobile units, lightly armed and composed primarily by African troops who were able to respond quickly to the needs of this kind of war. Men coming from the loyal Eritrean colony, from Somalia, Libya, from the countries on the Red Sea and even from Ethiopia, progressively replaced Italian troops. In Libya, warfighting and counterinsurgency operations were conducted mainly by regular infantry (Libyan battalions, Méharists, Saharian) and cavalry units (Savaris and Spahis), while in Ethiopia, regular and irregular bands were used. Vincere! offers a look at some of the earliest irregular warfare and counterinsurgency operations the modern Italian forces ever conducted.Italian forces faced local populations while conducting counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in what was, for them, a new theater of war. In Libya, the rebellion was quelled in the space of ten years, at an admittedly high price for the regional forces. In Ethiopia, where COIN operations were interrupted by World War II, the available data suggests that military actions, accompanied by a more responsible policy toward the population, would have eventually defeated the insurgency. The use of airpower in Ethiopia made a huge difference, and its lessons were learned long before the French experience in Algeria. The Italians waged counterinsurgency operations over twenty years in two geographically separate theaters, and in two very different operational environments and much of value for current practitioners and scholars can be learned from these different experiences.


Vincere: The Italian Royal Army's Counterinsurgency Operations in Africa 1922–1940 by Federica Saini Fasanotti Review


"Vincere" The Italian Royal Counterinsurgency Operations in Africa, 1922-1940 written by Federica Fasanotti is pretty much the first serious work in English on this subject. In reading it, you realize why it been so highly praised by General Mattis, and other notables such as the head of the NATO Joint Force Command and a former Chief of Defense for Italy. with the forward with by Gen Allen USMC (Ret.)Its amazing how much information and understanding of the counterinsurgency operationsshe is able to put in this study of 139 pages. it is a study, not a history and hence not in a chronological order, but a study clearly aimed at the academic and practitioner audiences.The study is in two parts, Libyan Operations and Ethiopian Operations, broken further down by 23 very short chapters dealing with specific topics (Libyan Environment, Garrison Network in Libya,Libyan Population, Ethiopian Environment, Garrison Network in Ethiopia, Ethiopian Population, etc).Professor Fasanotti believes the Italian Army was far better in fighting irregular wars than regular ones.The Italian Army was after nine years successful in defeating the insurgency in Libya and was well on its doing the same in Ethiopia in the fourth year of conflict when World War II swept their efforts away.The counterinsurgency operations had many, many missteps along the way, which is always the case no matter who is doing it. But fairly successful efforts was based on certain concepts. One was the Italian army understood from the very beginning that the population support or at least its acquiesce was the center of gravity. And that the political side was at least as important as the military. The Italians often took prisoners when they could and treated them well (Though when "rehabilitated" and released.was often found fighting killing/Italians again) They did their best to protect "submitted" populations,punish crimes committed by Italians soldiersagainst the natives populations ,rule though natives, etc. One of the Chief leaders of the insurgency wrote of two high ranking Italian officials"The number one enemies of Ethiopia are Duca d' Aosta and General Nasi because with their magnanimity they damp the feelings of Independence."The Italy also began a massive program to educate the general population, built a railroad/road system, hospitals and clinics,etc. All paid by the Italian taxpayers.It should be noted that while the Italian was the invaders and did commit crimes against the population, including at times executing villagers who only was suspected ofsupplying insurgents, the insurgents committed their own crimes. They never took prisoners but would torture to death by the most brutal means any Italian soldier who came into their hands. The insurgents would not allow anyone to be neutral. Not only villages that was "submitted' to the Italians but villages that refused to give monetary "donations" and food/men to the insurgents would be attacked. In Ethiopia, the insurgents would kill the men, cut off the women breasts and castrate the boys.As for Military side of the counterinsurgency, Italy depended on indigenous volunteers and other volunteers from the Italian colonies. Though normally commanded by Italian officers. This was cheaper than using Italian troops and the Italian command considered the indigenous troops to be more mobile and had betterendurance than Italian troops. These light very mobile columns aided immeasurably by air power did well against the insurgents.-though of course not always.It was by these concepts (besides a massive bard wire project in Libya to separate the population from the insurgents.) among others, including a healthy respect for the insurgents' fighting abilities and a belief to never let up on the insurgents and to put to constantly put pressure on them that enable the Italian army to have the success that it did. Though of course, again there were many mishaps and mistakes in the way.While one is tempted to say any short book strongly praised by General Mattis is worthy of anybody's time, this book does have a textbook flavor in it. Professor Fasanotti clearly was trying to give the readeran understanding of the different concepts of the insurgences and counterinsurgencies and how those concepts interrelated. And to tell it in a book that does not take much time to read. Not to tell a history( though by the time the reader is finished they will have a basic understanding of the history) or entertain the reader.This book is probably only worthwhile for those who have a deep interest in counter insurgency, but for these people it is priceless.Two notes: There is only one overall map of Africa. Though this is not a study where maps are needed, the reader may want to google the appropriate maps. Also many Italian or native terms are used. There is a glossary in the back that explain their meanings.

This book is a collection of military thoughts and ideas generated largely by the Italian military while fighting in Libya and later Ethiopia from 1911 to 1940 - NOT your typical essay style narrative. It is aimed at officers, especially the USMC, for handling and addressing insurgency and counterinsurgency. This is NOT for the general reader. It has a complete lack of maps so one must be familiar with the geography, and there are some poorly edited translations - I seriously doubt that an Italian cavalry squadron in 1924 contained 42 forklifts (p41) - should be supply carts. This book belongs in the catagory with General Garnet Wolseley THE SOLDIER'S POCKET-BOOK FOR FIELD SERVICE.

The 1920s and 1930s saw fascism on the march. Italy, with the dubious distinction of being the first country to fall under the sway of the fascists, soon found itself beginning the first of its overseas ventures in Africa. While Mussolini’s expansion into Ethiopia is often used to illustrate the growing threat of fascism prior to WWII, less well-known or discussed is the guerrilla war in Libya. The Italians considered the operation to be a “reconquest” of territory that already belonged to it due to a successful campaign fought against the Ottomans prior to WWI. In fact, total control of Italy’s newest colonial acquisition was never achieved during the first decade, with Italian control limited to coastal enclaves. Once Mussolini became Prime Minister a concerted effort to achieve proper domination of Libya.The first half of the book looks at the efforts of the Royal Army (and the Italian Royal Air Force) to defeat the insurgent Berbers and Arabs of Libya in an environment that was both physically challenging and culturally daunting. One of the reasons that Italy was not able to take full possession of the colony after the Ottomans ceded it to them was the vast desert areas of Libya. The Italians also did not understand the “human geography” of the land. However, Italian soldiers who learned their craft while fighting the Austro-Hungarians in the Alps soon found their feet in the sands of the Sahara. Many had fought the Great War under conditions that are unimaginable to us today and, if not inured to hardship then they at least could deal with it. They also learned to try different techniques and different technologies to succeed rather than the same techniques and weapons that had been used so many times before. The Alps might have been about as different from the Sahara as one could find on Earth, but it served as a training school for motivated and imaginative leaders.Italy was involved in an insurgency in Libya. Truth be told, Libya was barely the Ottomans’ to give away; the Turks who ran the Empire were almost as foreign to the Berbers and Arabs as the Italians would be later. The Italians tried to use Metropolitan units to secure Libya but the solution turned out to be the employment of colonial troops on behalf of the Italian authorities.This meant bringing Eritrean and Somalian troops from the Horn of Africa, as well as the employment of certain tribes and clans within Libya against insurgents who represented traditional enemies. Not only were these forces easy to outfit and maintain, they were also much less costly to maintain than Metropolitan troops. Under Italian supervision they were just as fast and effective in the Sahara as the insurgents.Those Libyans who were not part of the insurgency were a problem for the Italians. Insurgent fighters used rifles and other weapons against the Italians, therefore non-military possession of weapons was outlawed. However, this left a population that might otherwise be neutral at the mercy of the insurgents with no means to defend themselves (promises of protection by Italian forces could rarely be kept). The insurgents were able to garner reluctant support from the populace with threats of force, receiving intelligence and food to maintain the insurgency. Radical efforts were employed to separate the insurgents from their means of support.Aircraft and motor vehicles were employed to bring the fight to the insurgents, although camel caravans continued to be important, especially to colonial troops. Early on, aircraft proved their worth as “flying artillery” and in finding the enemy. Clearly, the Italians were aware of British doctrine in this field and adapted it for their own use in North Africa.The second book looks at Ethiopia. While the “reconquest” of Libya took place in the 1920s the Italo-Ethiopian War was in the 1930s. The destruction of Ethiopia’s army and the occupation of the country took only a few months but the resulting insurgency continued on for several years. Experience in the Sahara during the previous decade was applied to the Horn of Africa.In many ways, the environment was even more challenging for the Italians than Libya was. Roads were narrow and turned to mud in the rainy season, making supplies brought in through the Italian colonies of Eritrea and Somaliland difficult to transport to the Italian Army. Recruitment of colonial units ran into problems since the tribal dynamics and poor discipline of askaris led to abuses of civilians, apparently with Italian approval. Indeed, the very nature of Ethiopian governance and society lent itself to insurgency: the former leader of the country, Negus Haile Selassie, ruled among the tribes by diplomacy, not through military strength or legal convention or political power.Airpower could make a difference but the Italian government emphasized economy over force in Ethiopia, reminding commanders how many lira every hour of aircraft flight time cost the State. In any case, there was little to bomb once the army dissolved and insurgents melted into villages that looked like every other village. Even shipping captured leaders of the insurgency to an island off the coast of Italy did little to dampen the fighting.Overall, Fasanotti’s book is an excellent study, not of specific military actions (which one could argue are irrelevant in the context of counterinsurgency) but of the realistic appraisal of the insurgents, their capabilities and their weaknesses.

Saini Fasanotti has written an engaging treatise on the Italian politics against insurgency in Lybia and Ethiopia before the opening of WW2 . This is not a chronological narrative of the counterinsurgency operations by Itlian military and colonial troops , but a sort of handbook about various aspects of these . The author speaks about Lybia at first and then Ethipia. Chapeters are The Lybia environment, doctrine, insurgency, garrison, officers, indigenous units, population, military organization of the territory, royal air force and so on , the same about Ethipian theatre. You can read the book from opening to the end but also a chapter at time as you prefer . If you want know something more or a much detailed narration of the Italian oprations you can read the two Italian language monography written by Saini Fasanotti on Lybia and Ethiopia . Great works, much needed subjects .

Vincere: The Italian Royal Army's Counterinsurgency Your browser indicates if you've visited this linkhttps com/Vincere-Italian-Counterinsurgency-Operations-1922-1940/dp/1682474283Vincere! presents an overview of the counterinsurgency operations carried out by the Italian Royal Army from 1922 to 1941 in Libya and Ethiopia Based on ten years of study conducted in the Italian archives and on the ground, this volume looks at a period when the Italian Royal Army faced significant new challenges in the conduct of war "Vincere!" : the Italian Royal Army's counterinsurgency Your browser indicates if you've visited this linklink library mst edu/portal/Vincere--the-Italian-Royal-Armys/EgZWwEE-o9o/"Based on ten years of study in the Italian archives and on the ground, this book examines a little-known topic: the counterinsurgency operations carried out by the Italian Royal Army in Libya and Ethiopia from 1922 to 1941"--"Vincere!" : the Italian Royal Army's counterinsurgency Your browser indicates if you've visited this linkhttps searchworks stanford edu/view/13521027Stanford Libraries' official online search tool for books, media, journals, databases, government documents and more "Vincere!" The Italian Royal Army's Counterinsurgency Your browser indicates if you've visited this linkhttps searchworks stanford edu/articles/brd__147763000Stanford Libraries' official online search tool for books, media, journals, databases, government documents and more "Vincere!": The Italian Royal Army's Counterinsurgency Your browser indicates if you've visited this linkhttps books google com/books/about/Vincere html?id=gVO8wwEACAAJVincere! presents an overview of the counterinsurgency operations carried out by the Italian Royal Army from 1922 to 1941 in Libya and Ethiopia Based on ten years of study conducted in the Italian archives and on the ground, this volume looks at a period when the Italian Royal Army faced significant new challenges in the conduct of war Facing new challenges in an atypical theater of war Vincere: The Italian Royal Army's CounterinsurgencyYour browser indicates if you've visited this linkhttps pacific-works co/6072c11682474283607-Vincere-The-Italian-Royal-Army-s-Counterinsurgency-Operations-in-Africa-1922-1940[Reading] ➿ Vincere: The Italian Royal Army's Counterinsurgency Operations in Africa 1922-1940 By - Pacific-works co Vincere presents an overview of the counterinsurgency operations carried out by the Italian Royal Army from 1922 to 1941 in Libya and Ethiopia Based on ten years of study conducted in the Italian archVincere presents an overview of the Vincere!" The Italian Royal Army's Counterinsurgency Your browser indicates if you've visited this linkhttps laptrinhx com/vincere-the-italian-royal-army-s-counterinsurgency-operations-in-africa-1922-1940-2029719167/On 9 May 1936, after seven months of conventional warfare, the Italian Royal Army seized control of Addis Ababa, the capital of Ethiopia, and proudly announced the realization of an Italian empire in the Horn of Africa—Africa Orientale Italiana In her new book, "Vincere!" The Italian Royal Army's Counterinsurgency Operations in Africa, 1922-1940, military historian Federica Saini Vincere: The Italian Royal Army's Counterinsurgency Your browser indicates if you've visited this linkhttps biblio com/book/vincere-italian-royal-armys-counterinsurgency-operations/d/1388421733Vincere: The Italian Royal Army's Counterinsurgency Operations in Africa 1922â€"1940 by Fasanotti, Federica Saini Used; Condition Used - Very Good ISBN 10 1682474283 ISBN 13 9781682474280 SellerVincere!" The Italian Royal Army's Counterinsurgency Your browser indicates if you've visited this linkhttps intellibriefs blogspot com/2020/08/vincere-italian-royal-armys html#Reviewing Vincere! Caitlin Collis August 5, 2020 "Vincere!" The Italian Royal Army's Counterinsurgency Operations in Africa, 1922-1940 Vincere: The Italian Royal Army's Counterinsurgency Your browser indicates if you've visited this linkbancarel w27 wh-2 com/aran/1682474283-vincere-the-italian-royal-armys-counterinsurgency-operations-in-africa-1922-1940Scarica PDF Vincere: The Italian Royal Army's Counterinsurgency Operations in Africa, 1922-1940 gratis È facile e immediato il download di libri in formato pdf e epub Se vuoi saperne di più sugli eBook gratuiti, su come scaricare eBook gratis e sulla lettura digitale €Qui puoi scaricare questo libro in formato PDF gratuitamente senza bisogno di spendere soldi extra More results


Vincere: The Italian Royal Army's Counterinsurgency Operations in Africa 1922–1940 by Federica Saini Fasanotti


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